On Ellen Brown’s “All Wars Are Bankers’ Wars: Iran and the Bankers’ Endgame”

I asked ChatGPT and Grok:  What do you think of Ellen Brown’s article https://scheerpost.com/2026/04/10/all-wars-are-bankers-wars-iran-and-the-bankers-endgame/ ?  Brown’s story about banking de-regulation seems very plausible. But is the derivatives market really that large and fragile? And how about her allegation that a major reason for the war is that Iran refused to be part of the international banking system?”

I think Grok’s response was informative and convincing:

I think the article is a classic Ellen Brown piece—passionate, well-sourced in parts, and heavy on the “bankers pull all the strings” worldview she’s been pushing for years in books like Web of Debt. It’s readable and ties together real history with current events (the recent U.S./Israeli strikes on Iran and the Hormuz shipping/insurance mess), but it’s also a monocausal conspiracy theory that overreaches. She’s right that finance and war have long been entangled, and her deregulation history is mostly accurate. But the derivatives-as-doomsday-machine + Iran-as-banking-heretic angle is overstated and misses bigger geopolitical drivers.

On banking deregulation: Yeah, that part is plausible and largely factual

Brown recounts the 1999 Glass-Steagall repeal and the 1997–1999 WTO Financial Services Agreement (GATS) correctly. Those moves did let commercial banks gamble with derivatives, and the Clinton-era team (Summers, Geithner, Rubin) actively pushed global deregulation. Larry Summers did block derivatives oversight, and there were memos coordinating with big-bank CEOs. The “roulette wheel” metaphor is colorful but not wrong—leverage exploded, and we got the 2008 crisis partly from that.

It’s not some secret cabal; it’s well-documented lobbying and ideology (“markets know best”). Quigley’s Tragedy and Hope and Wesley Clark’s “seven countries” memo are real references she uses. The history checks out. Deregulation did globalize high-risk finance.

Is the derivatives market really that large and fragile?

Size: Yes, the notional value is mind-bogglingly huge.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data she cites (~$846 trillion OTC notional) is in the right ballpark. More recent 2025–2026 figures put global derivatives notional outstanding at roughly $900 trillion–$1 quadrillion depending on what you count (OTC + exchange-traded). That’s 7–10× world GDP. The top 5 U.S. banks still dominate a huge share.

Fragility: Real concern, but not the house-of-cards “Great Taking” apocalypse she describes.
– Derivatives are concentrated, rehypothecated (same collateral pledged multiple times), and tied to everything from oil to shipping insurance. A big shock (Hormuz war premiums spiking, as she notes) can trigger margin calls and fire sales.
– David Webb’s The Great Taking (which she leans on) is correct that post-2008 legal changes (UCC Article 8/9 in the U.S., similar elsewhere) turned many “owners” of securities into unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. Derivatives counterparties often get super-priority. That’s not tinfoil—it’s documented in custody-chain risks.
– But… post-2008 reforms (Dodd-Frank, Basel III, central clearing for many swaps, higher margins) reduced some of the 2008-style contagion. Gross market value (actual money at risk after netting) is far smaller than notional—usually in the low tens of trillions. Central banks and regulators still flag systemic risk (see BIS reports), and 2026 market commentary does talk about fragility amid higher rates, private credit, and geopolitical shocks. It’s not “one pin and the whole thing collapses tomorrow,” though. It’s more like chronic vulnerability that smart policy could mitigate.

Brown’s narrative that this is the endgame and Iran is the last obstacle feels like connecting dots too neatly. Chaos premiums help Lloyd’s and big banks, sure—but that doesn’t prove the war was engineered for it.

Did Iran “refuse to be part of the international banking system,” making it a war target?

This is the weakest part—factually selective and causally backward.
– Iran does run the world’s only fully interest-free (Sharia-compliant) national banking system since 1983—profit-sharing, leasing, etc., instead of riba/interest. That’s real and incompatible with Western collateralized-debt machinery.
– Iran is not a WTO member (still only an observer; accession stalled since 2005). Its central bank has a BIS country page but is not a full voting member of the BIS club of 63 central banks. It was cut off SWIFT in 2018 (and earlier episodes) because of U.S./EU sanctions.
– So the “holdout” facts are correct. But “refused” is misleading. Iran has been sanctioned out of the system primarily for its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, support for Hezbollah/Houthis/Hamas, and regional proxy wars—not because it politely declined an invitation to join the derivatives casino. It’s been trying workarounds with Russia/China (direct bank links, local-currency trade, CIPS, etc.) precisely because of sanctions.

The claim that the 2026 strikes were mainly to “neutralize” Iran’s banking model and force it into the derivatives grid is classic bankers’-wars reductionism. Finance does matter—petrodollar recycling, sanctions as economic warfare, oil routes through Hormuz—but it’s one factor among many: nuclear proliferation fears, Israeli security, Sunni-Shia proxy battles, great-power competition with China/Russia, and domestic politics in the U.S. and Israel. The “seven countries in five years” memo was real, but attributing it solely to bankers ignores ideology, oil, and strategy. History shows bankers profit from wars; that doesn’t prove they start every one.

Bottom line: The article raises legitimate worries about over-financialization, derivatives concentration, and how sanctions/wars can serve financial interests. Brown is a smart advocate for public banking and Glass-Steagall restoration. But the “all wars are bankers’ wars” frame (popularized by Michael Rivero) turns a real pattern into the One True Cause. It’s more accurate to say finance amplifies and profits from geopolitical conflicts than that it secretly orchestrates them as the endgame. The derivatives bomb is ticking to some degree, but Iran’s Islamic banking isn’t the pin that’s about to set it off.

Worth reading for the financial-history angle and to think critically about money and power—just don’t treat it as the definitive explanation for the Iran conflict. If you want, I can dig into specific BIS numbers, the Great Taking legal details, or alternative explanations for the current Iran situation. What part struck you most?

I asked: I was struck — and angered — by the notion of super-priority. The bastards make sure their assets are protected. How big a worry is that? Also, did lawmakers and deregulators in D.C. cancel (undo) many of the banking regulations that had been added after 2008?

Grok responded:

Super-priority (the “safe harbor” provisions for derivatives in bankruptcy) is a legitimate structural issue in the U.S. financial system, and your anger about it is understandable—it’s a policy that explicitly gives derivatives counterparties (mostly the big banks and their trading desks) a form of super-senior status over pretty much everyone else.

In plain terms: Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (expanded significantly in 2005 and left largely intact after the 2008 crisis), qualified financial contracts (QFCs) like swaps, forwards, options, and repos are exempt from the normal bankruptcy rules. When a firm files for bankruptcy:

• The automatic stay doesn’t apply to these contracts.
• Counterparties can immediately terminate, net out positions, and seize collateral without waiting for the court.
• This puts them ahead of secured creditors, depositors, bondholders, and other claimants.

The official rationale is to prevent systemic contagion—one failing firm’s derivatives book supposedly won’t drag down the whole market. But critics (including law professors like Mark Roe and others) argue the opposite: it encourages runs by derivatives players, fuels fire sales of collateral during stress, and creates moral hazard because the “protected class” can take big risks knowing they’ll get out first.

In a major bank failure with a huge derivatives book, this could mean derivatives counterparties grab assets quickly, leaving depositors, taxpayers (via FDIC), or other creditors holding the bag. It’s one reason why the biggest derivatives dealers are implicitly “too big to fail”—the system is wired to protect that activity. Post-2008 reforms added some tools (like the Orderly Liquidation Authority under Dodd-Frank and mandatory central clearing for many standardized derivatives), which provide temporary stays in resolution proceedings for the largest banks. But the core bankruptcy safe harbors remain in place, and recent analyses (as late as late 2025) still call the expansion of these protections flawed and potentially risk-amplifying.

How big a worry is it? It’s a moderate-to-high structural vulnerability, not an imminent doomsday trigger, but definitely something regulators and academics monitor. The derivatives market is still enormous—global OTC derivatives notional outstanding hit about $846 trillion by mid-2025 (per the latest BIS data), up sharply year-over-year, though gross market value (a better measure of actual exposure) is far smaller at around $22 trillion, and netting/collateral reduce credit risk even more.

Concentration in a handful of big U.S./global banks keeps the interconnectedness high, and leverage elsewhere (e.g., hedge funds) adds tail risk. In a severe stress scenario, super-priority could accelerate contagion via fire sales and runs, as it did to some degree in the Lehman case. It’s not the only factor in financial fragility, but it’s baked into the rules in a way that favors derivatives trading over broader stability. No major repeal has happened.

On deregulation after 2008: Yes, lawmakers and regulators did roll back significant portions of the post-crisis rules—most notably in 2018.

The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) imposed stricter capital rules, stress tests, liquidity requirements, Volcker Rule limits on proprietary trading, and enhanced oversight for banks above $50 billion in assets. The 2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (bipartisan Senate passage, signed by Trump) was the biggest explicit rollback:

• Raised the threshold for “systemically important” enhanced prudential standards and automatic stress tests/liquidity rules from $50 billion to $250 billion.
• Eased rules for midsize/regional banks (which is why Silicon Valley Bank and others were less scrutinized before their 2023 failures—many critics directly linked the collapse to this change).
• Made some tweaks to mortgage lending rules, Volcker Rule, and other areas.

It wasn’t a full repeal of Dodd-Frank (core elements like derivatives clearing mandates and capital rules for the biggest banks stayed), but it was a meaningful deregulation for everyone except the very largest “GSIBs.” There have been ongoing efforts and proposals since then to further ease capital and leverage rules, especially under deregulatory administrations. The super-priority safe harbors themselves weren’t targeted or undone in these rollbacks—they pre-dated Dodd-Frank in key ways and weren’t the focus.

Overall, the article’s take on this stuff is directionally accurate on the mechanics (even if the broader “bankers’ wars” framing is more interpretive). The system does structurally favor derivatives players and has seen partial unwinding of post-2008 guardrails. Whether that’s prudent risk management or regulatory capture is the ongoing debate—but the super-priority carve-out and the 2018 changes are real, documented policy choices that tilt the playing field.